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Abstract: This article examines and critiques Canadian legal 
responses to disputes over frozen in vitro embryos. It argues 
that current laws that provide spouses or partners with joint 
control over the use and disposition of embryos created from 
their genetic materials and that mandate the creation of 
agreements setting out these parties’ intentions in the event of 
a disagreement or divorce overlook the experiences of women 
who undergo in vitro fertilization treatment. It also maintains 
that these laws do not accord with how Canadian law and 
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public policy has responded to similar conflicts between 
spouses, or to agreements that seek to control or restrict 
women’s reproductive choices. This article considers how 
legislatures and courts in other jurisdictions have sought to 
respond to embryo disposition disputes, but argues that their 
respective approaches raise similar issues and would pose 
additional problems within the Canadian context. It ultimately 
provides recommendations for how Canadian laws might better 
support the express objectives of the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act and Quebec’s Act Respecting Clinical and 
Research Activities Relating to Assisted Procreation to protect 
the health and well-being of women, to promote the principle of 
free and informed consent and to recognize that women are 






In December 2012, the British Columbia Supreme Court was 
faced with the first Canadian “custody” dispute over frozen 
embryos. Like many Canadians who have difficulty 
conceiving, Gregory and Juanita Nott turned to in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) treatment in the hope of building their 
family. They created embryos using their own ova and sperm 
and Mrs. Nott successfully gave birth to two children. 
Following treatment in 2004, the couple was left with four 
embryos, which they jointly consented to freeze and store for 
future reproductive use. Since then, however, Mr. and Mrs. 
Nott’s relationship has become strained; they separated in 2011 
and then sought to obtain a divorce. In July 2012, they received 
notice that their fertility clinic was closing down and a request 
that they jointly consent to their embryos being transferred to 
another clinic for future storage. The couple had signed a 
consent form, at the time of the embryos’ creation, saying that 
should either party refuse to consent to the embryos being 
transferred, the clinic would have authority to destroy them. 




Mrs. Nott readily agreed to the transfer as she wishes to use the 
embryos in an attempt to have more children. Mr. Nott refused 
to authorize the transfer, as he wants the embryos to be 
destroyed. In December 2012, Mrs. Nott successfully obtained 
an injunction to prevent the embryos’ destruction, until their 
divorce trial can be heard and they can seek a judicial 
determination regarding what should happen to their embryos.1 
Media reports suggest that the case was to be heard in June 
2013,2 but it is unclear whether it proceeded to trial. As of June 
2014, a decision had yet to be released.3  
 
This dispute arose in part as a result of section 8 of the 
federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act4 (AHRA) and its 
associated AHR Consent Regulations.5 This legislation requires 
that spouses or common-law partners provide joint consent to 
use or donate in vitro embryos created for their reproductive 
use,6 and also allows one spouse or partner to unilaterally 
                                                
1  See Keith Fraser, “Woman wins Round 1 in embryo fight; Judge says 
they should be saved at least until couple’s divorce trial”, The 
Province [Vancouver, B.C.] (6 December 2012) A6; Christopher 
Reynolds & Pamela Fayerman, “B.C. woman wins some time in 
‘custody’ battle over frozen embryos”, The Vancouver Sun (6 
December 2012), online: The Vancouver Sun <http://www.vancouver 
sun.com/>. 
2  Ibid.  
3  The British Columbia Supreme Court’s recorded entries for this file 
are not available to the public, but as of June 8 2014 they continued to 
indicate that the file was last modified on May 28 2013.   
4  Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA]. 
5  Assisted Human Reproduction (Section 8 Consent) Regulations, 
SOR/2007-137 [AHR Consent Regulations]. 
6  See AHRA, supra note 4, s 8(3) (which explains that embryos may 
not be used without the donor’s consent); AHR Consent Regulations, 
supra note 5, s 10(1) (which explain that a “donor” is the “individual 
or individuals for whose reproductive use an in vitro embryo is 




withdraw his or her previously given consent, in writing,7 prior 
to the embryos being used, thawed or designated for a specific 
purpose.8 One effect of these laws is that where a couple, like 
Mr. and Mrs. Nott, have created embryos from their own ova 
and sperm in order to build their family,9 one party may change 
                                                                                           
created” and includes “the couple who are spouses or common-law 
partners at the time the in vitro embryo is created, regardless of the 
source of the human reproductive material used to create the 
embryo”), s 10(2) (which requires compatible consent from a couple 
for their consent to comply with the regulations) and s 13 (which 
requires that prior to making use of an in vitro embryo, an individual 
will have the written consent of the donor stating that the embryo 
may be used for the donor’s own reproductive use, or may be donated 
for third-party reproduction, for research or for instruction.) 
7  See AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 5, s 14(3) (which allows 
either spouse or partner to withdraw the donor’s consent) and s 14(1) 
(which clearly stipulates that this withdrawal must be in writing).   
8   The timing for revocation differs depending on whether consent was 
given to use the embryos, or to donate them for third party 
reproduction, for research or for instruction. In the case of consent 
given to use the embryos for their own reproductive use, revocation 
can only happen before implantation. In the case of donation for third 
party reproductive use, withdrawal is only possible “before the third 
party acknowledges in writing that the embryos have been designated 
for their reproductive use.” In the case of donation for research or 
instruction, withdrawal must happen before the embryos are thawed, 
or a person acknowledges in writing that the embryos have been 
designated for that purpose, or before the creation of a stem line, 
whichever of these occurrences happens the latest. See AHR Consent 
Regulations, supra note 5, s 14.  
9  Where a same-sex or opposite-sex couple uses donated sperm or ova 
to create embryos, this couple will similarly be considered the 
“donor” and will be required to provide joint consent to their embryos 
being used or donated while they are in a relationship. However, the 
law also stipulates that if their relationship or marriage breaks down, 
only the genetic contributor will be considered the “donor” under the 
law and will have exclusive control over the embryos’ use or 
disposition. AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 5, s 10(3).  




his or her mind and prevent the other from using these embryos 
to have more children.10  
 
This case has also come about because of uncertainty 
under the law as to whether embryo disposition agreements or 
consent forms are legally enforceable. While the AHRA states 
that embryos cannot be used or donated without the consent of 
both spouses,11 it does not clarify what will happen to a 
couple’s surplus embryos in the event the parties cannot come 
to an agreement and provide compatible consent. In other 
words, it does not say whether the embryos would have to 
remain in storage or could be destroyed. Quebec has sought to 
address this issue through its Regulation Respecting Clinical 
Activities Related to Assisted Procreation12 (Regulation 
Respecting Assisted Procreation), which stipulates that where 
embryos have been created but not used, spouses must express 
their intentions in writing regarding what should happen to 
their embryos in the event they disagree, one dies, their 
relationship or marriage ends, or the woman for whom the 
embryos were created is no longer of childbearing age or 
                                                
10  This would mean, for instance, that a woman could not use the 
embryos for her own IVF cycle, and that a man could not use them 
with a new partner. It would also mean that neither spouse/partner 
could use the embryos with a surrogate. According to her lawyers’ 
website, Mrs. Nott reportedly intended to argue that section 8 of the 
AHRA is unconstitutional as it violates her right to life, liberty and 
security of the person under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and is ultra vires federal jurisdiction. See 
Family Law Blog, “BC and Frozen Embryo Dispute Lawyers”, 
online: Maclean Law, < http://www.bcfamilylaw.ca/2012/12/05/bc-
and-canadian-frozen-embryo-family-dispute-lawyers/> 
11  For the sake of simplicity, the remainder of this article will use the 
language of “spouse” to denote both spouses and partners.  
12  Regulation Respecting Clinical Activities Related to Assisted 
Procreation, OC 644-2010, 7 July 2010, (2010) GOQ II, 2253, ss 19-
20 [Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation]. 




physically able to use them.13 While not legally required 
elsewhere in Canada, Canadian fertility clinics also ask their 
                                                
13  Ibid, s 21; Assisted reproductive technologies are currently regulated 
through federal and provincial legislation because this is an area of 
divided jurisdiction. For instance, prohibitions on payment for 
gametes, embryos and surrogacy fall within federal criminal law 
power and are therefore regulated through the federal Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act. See AHRA, supra note 4, ss 6-7; Other issues 
relating to the regulation of assisted reproduction, such as the 
collection and disclosure of donor information or determinations of 
parentage, fall within provincial jurisdiction over hospitals, property 
and civil rights and matters of a merely local nature. In 2007, the 
Quebec government brought a reference before the Quebec Court of 
Appeal arguing that the original version of the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act was unconstitutional as it impinged upon provincial 
jurisdiction. See Procureur Général du Québec c Procureur Général 
du Canada (Renvoi fait par le gouvernement du Québec en vertu de 
la Loi sur les renvois à la Cour d’appel, L.R.Q. ch. R-23, relativement 
à la constitutionnalité des articles 8 à 19, 40 à 53, 60, 61 et 68 de la 
Loi sur la procréation assistée, L.C. 2004, ch.2) 2008 QCCA 1167, 
[2008] JQ no 5489. The Quebec government was successful and the 
decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. However, 
before the SCC could render its decision, Quebec went ahead and 
introduced its own legislation and regulations pertaining to assisted 
procreation. On June 18 2009, the Quebec National Assembly passed 
Bill 26, An Act Respecting Clinical and Research Activities Relating 
to Assisted Procreation, 1st Sess, 39th Leg, and then in July 2010 
adopted its associated Regulations. See An Act Respecting Clinical 
and Research Activities Relating to Assisted Procreation, RSQ 2009, 
c A-5.01 [Act Respecting Assisted Procreation] and Regulation 
Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 12. In a split decision, 
the Supreme Court of Canada struck down parts of the AHRA as 
being ultra vires federal jurisdiction but maintained those provisions 
that it deemed to fall within the ambit of federal criminal law power. 
Section 8 of the AHRA and its AHR Consent Regulations were 
preserved and thus laws relating to disposition decisions between 
spouses remained the same. See Reference Re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61. The effect of the SCC’s decision is 
that currently there exists partial legislation regulating assisted 




clients to sign consent forms – prior to embryos being created 
or frozen – indicating what should happen to embryos if the 
parties can no longer provide compatible consent. If these 
agreements are legally enforceable then they may enable 
parties to contract around the right to revoke consent and allow 
for embryos to be used for reproduction or be donated, even in 
the event one spouse changes his or her mind. They may also, 
however, provide that embryos will be destroyed, even if one 
spouse, like Mrs. Nott, wishes to use them to have more 
children.  
 
This article examines these approaches towards 
resolving disputes over surplus embryos and considers whether 
they support the express objectives of the AHRA and Quebec’s 
Act Respecting Clinical and Research Activities Relating to 
Assisted Procreation (Act Respecting Assisted Procreation) to 
protect the health and well-being of women, to promote the 
principle of free and informed consent and to recognize that 
women are more directly affected than men by the use of 
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs).14 It suggests that 
while Canadian governments and lawmakers have paid lip 
service to these objectives, current laws seeking to regulate 
embryo disposition disputes do not fully support these statutes’ 
expressed intentions in practice. Adopting a contract model or 
allowing one individual to prevent his or her spouse or partner 
from using embryos for procreation overlooks the experiences 
of women who undergo in vitro fertilization treatment and also 
does not accord with how Canadian law and public policy has 
responded to similar conflicts between spouses, or to 
agreements that seek to control or restrict women’s 
reproductive choices. This article thus considers alternative 
                                                                                           
procreation in Canada and Canadian provinces are poised to follow 
Quebec’s lead and introduce their own legislation.  
14  AHRA, supra note 4 at ss 2(c), 2(d); Act Respecting Assisted 
Procreation, supra note 13, s 1. 




means of responding to these disputes and ultimately provides 
suggestions for law reform.  
 
This piece focuses specifically on how Canadian laws 
seek to regulate disputes where both spouses have used their 
own ova and sperm to create embryos. Where same-sex or 
opposite-sex couples use donated sperm or ova to conceive, the 
law is quite different; should their relationship dissolve, the 
spouse who was a genetic contributor will be given exclusive 
control over these embryos.15 Although the latter situation 
raises significant issues and is similarly vulnerable to 
criticism,16 a thorough exploration of the problems associated 
with this approach goes beyond the scope of this paper.17  
This article’s analysis contributes to longstanding 
debates within Canada regarding the merits and problems with 
                                                
15  AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 5, s 10(3); For instance, 
suppose Amy and Mary created embryos using Amy’s eggs and a 
donor’s sperm with the intention that the embryos be used for Mary 
to undergo IVF. In this case, should they divorce or separate prior to 
the embryos being used, Amy will have control over the embryos’ 
use or disposition and may prevent Mary from using them.  
16  For instance, these laws do not recognize that where a lesbian couple 
creates embryos for their own reproductive use, they may agree that 
one spouse will use her eggs while the other will undergo embryo 
implantation. It is questionable whether in such a scenario it is fair to 
allow the genetic contributor to have exclusive control. The spouse 
who did not harvest her eggs may have decided not to do so on the 
understanding that she would have children using her partner’s ova. It 
is also possible that by the time of a dispute, the spouse who did not 
use her eggs may no longer have viable ova. In turn, one might argue 
that such an approach also ignores the financial contribution that 
spouses may have jointly made to the embryos’ creation by paying 
for IVF treatments or potentially paying for sperm outside of Canada.  
17  It should be noted that in choosing this narrow focus, this paper does 
not intend to suggest that it is important to reproduce biologically, or 
that genetics ought to be privileged in determining who ought to be 
considered a parent under Canadian law.  




allowing spouses to jointly control embryo disposition and sign 
consent forms indicating their intentions.18 In doing so, it takes 
into account the current state of Canadian law and public 
policy, the growth of empirical research on IVF and the 
development of increased case law relating to the disposition of 
reproductive materials. It also builds upon Canadian 
scholarship that has debated the benefits and risks of applying a 
contract model in family law contexts,19 and which has 
                                                
18  See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Property in Potential Life? A Relational 
Approach to Choosing Legal Categories” (1993) 6:2 Can JL & Jur 
343; Michael Trebilcock et al, “Testing the Limits of Freedom of 
Contract: The Commercialization of Reproductive Materials and 
Services” (1994) 32 Osgoode Hall LJ 613; Roxanne Mykitiuk & 
Albert Wallrap, “Regulating Reproductive Technologies in Canada” 
in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen M Flood, eds, 
Canadian Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed (Markham, Ont.: 
Butterworths, 2002) 367; Christine Overall, “Frozen Embryos and 
‘Fathers’ Rights’: Parenthood and Decision-Making in the 
Cryopreservation of Embryos” in Joan C Callahan, ed, Reproduction, 
Ethics and the Law: Feminist Perspectives (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1995) 178. With the exception of Overall, none of 
this scholarship considers the merits or problems with these 
approaches in any detail but rather mentions them in passing. In 
addition, with the exception of Mykitiuk’s piece from 2002, the rest 
of this literature dates back to the early 1990s. There does not exist 
any recent published scholarship on this topic; however, this article 
cites to unpublished conference proceedings, recently prepared by 
Angela Campbell for the National Judicial Institute, on section 8 of 
the Assisted Human Reproduction Act and the different ways in 
which Canadian courts might seek to resolve disputes between 
spouses over surplus embryos. Her piece does not, however, discuss 
Quebec’s legislation. See Angela Campbell, “Averting 
Misconceptions: Judicial Analyses of Family Disputes over Stored 
Embryos” in National Judicial Institute, Proceedings of the National 
Judicial Institute Family Law Seminar (February 2012) at 4 
[unpublished, on file with author]. 
19  See e.g. Michael J Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, “The Role of 
Private Ordering in Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective 




advocated for a more “women-centered” legal approach 
towards the regulation of assisted procreation.20  
 
Part I argues that enforcing agreements or consent 
forms does not take into account studies and jurisprudence that 
call into question whether parties are in a position to make 
autonomous, informed decisions regarding embryo disposition 
prior to undergoing IVF treatment. In addition, Canadian law 
pertaining to domestic contracts, surrogacy and child adoption 
resists treating agreements in these contexts the same as 
binding commercial contracts because of similar concerns 
about whether such agreements reflect free and informed 
decision-making.  
 
Part II argues that allowing one individual to prevent 
his or her spouse from using their embryos for reproduction 
ignores the ways in which women are especially affected by 
the creation of embryos and disregards the costs of IVF. These 
laws seem to provide Canadians with the equivalent of a right 
not to procreate or parent, even though Canadian law relating 
to abortion, adoption and parentage or filiation do not provide 
similar rights, thus calling into question whether such rights 
ought to exist in relation to IVF embryos. 
  
                                                                                           
(1991) 41 UTLJ 533; Wanda A Wiegers, “Economic Analysis of Law 
and ‘Private Ordering’: A Feminist Critique” (1992) 42 UTLJ 170; 
Marcia Neave, “Resolving the Dilemma of Difference: A Critique of 
‘The Role of Private Ordering in Family Law’” (1994) 44 UTLJ 97.  
20  See e.g. Rosemarie Tong, “Feminist Perspectives and Gestational 
Motherhood: The Search for a Unified Legal Focus” in Joan C 
Callahan, ed, Reproduction, Ethics, and the Law: Feminist 
Perspectives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995) 55; 
Diana Majury, “Pre-conception Contracts: Giving the Mother the 
Option” in Simon Rosenblum, Peter Findlay & Ed Broadbent, eds, 
Debating Canada’s Future: Views from the Left (Toronto: James 
Lorimer & Co, 1991) 197.  




Part III then explores alternative means of resolving 
disputes over frozen embryos. It considers how legislatures and 
courts in other jurisdictions21 have responded to conflicts 
between spouses over embryo disposition and, in turn, how 
Canadian courts have dealt with analogous situations involving 
control over genetic material. These varied approaches raise 
similar issues to the Canadian contractual or joint consent 
models, and would also conflict with Canadian law and public 
policy relating to reproductive rights and the non-
commodification of reproductive materials.  
 
This article concludes by providing recommendations 
for how Canadian legislatures and courts might resolve 
disputes between spouses over their surplus embryos, in a 
manner that recognizes the experiences of individuals who 
undergo IVF treatment and the ways in which women are 
uniquely affected by assisted reproductive technologies. 
Genetic contributors should be unable to prevent their spouses 
from using embryos they have created for procreative purposes, 
and in the event that the parties divorce or separate and both 
wish to use them, a female spouse should be given priority in 
light of the greater health risks and complications associated 
with IVF for women than for men. Agreements between 
spouses signed prior to a woman undergoing IVF ought to be 
legally unenforceable. Moreover, some of the issues that arise 
in relation to embryo disposition could be resolved by 
providing for increased and mandatory counselling and by 
clarifying the parental rights and obligations of men or women 
who no longer wish for their spouse to use their frozen 
embryos for procreation.22  
                                                
21  The majority of existing case law dealing with disputes between 
spouses over embryos is from the United States, but there have also 
been cases in Israel and the United Kingdom.  
22  One might argue that an additional means of resolving these 
disposition issues would be to freeze a woman’s eggs rather than 
embryos for future reproductive use and to thus avoid issues of joint 





EMBRYO DISPOSITION AGREEMENTS AND 
CONSENT FORMS 
 
While Canadian courts have yet to clarify whether agreements 
between spouses or clinic consent forms are legally binding, it 
is worth exploring the implications of adopting a contract 
model in this context. On this approach, the decision parties 
made prior to creating embryos would be binding, unless 
spouses jointly agreed to update their consent form or 
agreement at a later point in time. Thus if spouses had elected, 
for instance, to donate their embryos for reproduction in the 
event of a disagreement, they would be bound by this decision 
even if, at a later date, one of the parties no longer finds this 
option palatable. Importantly, their original choice would also 
be enforced if one party still wishes to use the embryos for 
reproduction. These agreements might also, however, allow 
spouses or partners to potentially circumvent the AHRA and 
AHR Consent Regulations, which require joint consent to use 
or donate embryos.23 For instance, parties might have stipulated 
in their agreement that if they disagree or divorce, one spouse 
will be uniquely given control over the embryos, or a third 
party, such as a judge or clinic, will be given authority to make 
a decision. The only decisions that could not be binding would 
                                                                                           
control in the first place. In the future this may provide a viable way 
to prevent these issues from arising. At the moment, however, while 
egg freezing techniques are becoming increasingly sophisticated, this 
procedure is still in its infancy. Embryo freezing remains common 
practice because embryos are more resistant to freezing techniques 
and are able to be thawed and implanted with a greater chance of 
successful pregnancy than frozen eggs. See e.g. Alison Motluk, 
“Growth of Egg Freezing Blurs ‘Experimental’ Label” (2011) 46 
Nature 382; Karey Harwood, “Egg Freezing: A Breakthrough for 
Reproductive Autonomy?” (2009) 23 Bioethics 39.  
23  See Part II for a detailed discussion of these provisions regarding 
joint consent. 




be those that would clearly violate Canadian law and public 
policy.24  
 
This contractual approach has long received support 
from Canadian scholars, ethicists and physicians. Twenty years 
ago, when Canadians were first debating how best to address 
potential conflicts over frozen embryos, the government-
appointed Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies recommended that gamete providers be jointly 
required to make decisions regarding the disposition of their 
embryos prior to gametes being retrieved or embryos created, 
and to indicate their preferences in consent forms that would be 
binding for the clinic involved.25 Some Canadian scholars 
similarly proposed that while it might be appropriate for the 
Canadian government to establish a default for what would 
happen to embryos in the event that the genetic contributors 
divorce or die, Canadians ought to be able to contract around 
this default using consent forms.26 
Support for a clear-cut contractual approach is not 
surprising. It was thought that enforcing agreements would 
prevent disputes between spouses and litigation over embryo 
                                                
24  For instance, parties could not agree that in the event they divorce, 
the remaining embryos could be sold for reproductive use or research 
and the proceeds be divided amongst the spouses; such an 
arrangement would directly contravene the AHRA’s prohibitions on 
buying and selling gametes. See AHRA, supra note 4, s 7. They also 
clearly could not sign a binding agreement that in the event of a 
disagreement between spouses, the female spouse would nonetheless 
be forced to use the embryos for procreation as this too would violate 
Canadian public policy relating to women’s reproductive autonomy.  
25  Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, Proceed 
with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa: Minister of Government 
Services Canada, 1993) at 598.  
26  See Trebilcock, supra note 18 at 691.  




disposition.27 In theory, using agreements to resolve disputes 
would also mean that neither party would be forced to dispose 
of their embryos in a manner that they had not previously 
contemplated; spouses would have been aware precisely of 
what would happen to their embryos should certain events arise 
and couples would have been in a position to negotiate at that 
time what they felt would be the most appropriate manner to 
resolve any future disputes. The parties would be informed as 
to their options, and would be free to refuse to consent to 
treatment should they be unable to come to an agreement.  
 
 It is far from clear, however, that Canadians are in a 
position to provide free and informed consent regarding 
embryo disposition at the time these agreements and consent 
forms are signed. As the number of individuals undergoing IVF 
has grown over the last three decades, so has the social science 
research available on the experiences of individuals undergoing 
treatment and the decisions they make regarding their frozen 
embryos. This literature demonstrates that many individuals 
change their minds about whether they would like to use, 
donate or destroy their surplus embryos following IVF 
treatment and especially following the birth of a child. The lack 
of mandatory counselling and legal advice for individuals 
undergoing IVF in Canada may mean that spouses make 
decisions without fully understanding the legal implications of 
their choices. In turn, judicial decisions from Canada and 
abroad also suggest that individuals, and especially women, 
who make decisions regarding their embryos may be so eager 
to begin the IVF process that they may not contemplate the 
potential consequences of the agreements they are signing, or 
may agree to a disposition option in order to appease their 
spouse. The following section will consider each of these 
concerns in turn. 
 
Free and Informed Consent 
                                                
27  See Proceed with Care, supra note 25 at 598.  





Change of Heart 
 
Empirical research demonstrates that many patients change 
their minds regarding what should happen to their extra 
embryos following IVF and especially after successfully giving 
birth to a child through these methods.28 A number of studies 
have shown that while a substantial number of individuals or 
couples indicated initially – pre-IVF treatment – that they 
would be interested in donating their surplus embryos for third-
party reproduction or research, the vast majority did not follow 
through when asked again to make a decision following 
treatment.29 For instance, in one American study 71% of 
couples changed their preference regarding disposition between 
the time the embryos were created and when they were asked 
to make a final decision.30 A Canadian study demonstrates that 
while most patients preferred to donate their embryos to 
research prior to undergoing IVF, and indicated this preference 
on their consent forms, many had a change of heart after 
completing IVF and decided to discard them.31  
 
                                                
28  See Eric Blyth et al, “Embryo Relinquishment for Family Building: 
How Should it be Conceptualised?” (2011) 25:2 Int’l JL Pol’y & Fam 
260 at 266.  
29  See e.g. Sheryl De Lacey, “Parent Identity and “Virtual” Children: 
Why Patients Discard rather than Donate Unused Embryos” (2005) 
20:6 Human Reproduction 1661 at 1661-1662 [De Lacey, “Parent 
Identity”]; CR Newton et al, “Changes in Patient Preferences in the 
Disposal of Cryopreserved Embryos” (2007) 22:12 Human 
Reproduction 3124 [Newton, “Changes”]. 
30  See Susan C Klock, Sandra Sheinin & Ralph R Kazer, “The 
Disposition of Unused Frozen Embryos” (2001) 345 N Engl J Med 
69. 
31  See Newton, “Changes”, supra note 29 at 3127.  




Some scholars have hypothesized that this change of 
heart may be linked to individuals’ changing perceptions of 
their embryos.32 Qualitative and quantitative research on IVF 
and embryo donation suggests that patients’ perceptions of 
their frozen embryos often shifts over time and is particularly 
liable to change following IVF treatment.33 These studies 
reveal that many women who successfully conceived using 
IVF began to see their embryos as their potential children.34 
For instance, one study recounted that of 75 women 
interviewed who had undergone IVF, 90% viewed their 
embryos as potential persons and as potential brothers or sisters 
to their own children.35 Other research explains that couples 
with in vitro embryos began to describe them as their “virtual 
children.”36   
Once individuals successfully conceived through IVF, 
many expressed reluctance to donate what they perceived as 
                                                
32  See Blyth, supra note 28 at 267.  
33  See e.g. Robert D Nachtigall et al, “How Couples Who have 
Undergone In Vitro Fertilization Decide what to do with Surplus 
Embryos” (2009) 92 Fertility and Sterility 2094; Newton, “Changes”, 
supra note 29. 
34  See e.g. Robert D Nachtigall et al, “Parents’ Conceptualizations of 
their Frozen Embryos Complicates the Disposition Decision” (2005) 
84 Fertility and Sterility 431 at 433 [Nachtigall, “Parents’ 
Conceptualizations”]; Catherine A McMahon et al, “Mothers 
Conceiving Through In Vitro Fertilization: Siblings, Setbacks and 
Embryo Dilemmas After Five Years” (2000) 10 Repro Tech 131 at 
133 [McMahon, “Mothers Conceiving”]. 
35  See McMahon, “Mothers Conceiving”, supra note 34 at 133.  
36  See De Lacey, “Parent Identity”, supra note 29; Nachtigall, “Parents’ 
Conceptualizations” supra note 34 at 433; De Lacey clarifies, 
however, that this view is distinct from the perception that embryos 
are “unborn children” or are already lives from the moment of 
conception. See De Lacey, “Parent Identity”, supra note 29 at 1667.  




their biological offspring or “children.”37 Some drew an 
analogy to adoption, and explained that they could not bear the 
thought of giving away their genetic kin.38 For instance, one 
woman who changed her mind explained: “And I felt good 
about that whole thing until the time came when I had to make 
that decision and I found that [began weeping] … I couldn’t 
donate them. I never thought about that [someone else having 
my child] really.”39 Several respondents in other studies 
explained that they could not conceive of their genetic 
offspring living elsewhere and being raised by other parents.40 
As one pointed out: “I feel guilty that I have five embryos in 
storage and that I am unwilling to donate them. But I see the 
embryos as my children, and them being raised by someone 
else would be something I would never get over. I see it as like 
adopting out one of my twins.”41 Another explained: “Having 
my child living somewhere else is not acceptable. It’s not like 
                                                
37  See De Lacey, “Parent Identity” supra note 29 at 1665; McMahon, 
“Mothers Conceiving”, supra note 34 at 133.   
38  See e.g. Maggie Kirkman, “Egg and Embryo Donation and the 
Meaning of Motherhood” (2003) 38:2 Women and Health 1 at 10; De 
Lacey, “Parent Identity”, supra note 29 at 1666; Sheryl De Lacey, 
“Decisions For the Fate of Frozen Embryos: Fresh Insights into 
Patients’ Thinking and Their Rationales for Donating or Discarding 
Embryos” (2007) 22 Human Reproduction 1751 at 1754.   
39  See De Lacey, “Parent Identity”, supra note 29 at 1664.  
40  See e.g. Catherine A McMahon & Douglas M Saunders, “Attitudes of 
Couples with Stored Frozen Embryos Toward Conditional Embryo 
Donation” (2009) 91:1 Fertility and Sterility 140 at 144; Julianne 
Zweifel et al, “Needs Assessment for those donating to stem cell 
research” 88:3 (2007) Fertility and Sterility 560 at 562; Karin 
Hammarberg & Leesa Tinney, “Deciding the Fate of Supernumerary 
Frozen Embryos: A Survey of Couples’ Decisions and the Factors 
Influencing their Choice” (2006) 86 Fertility and Sterility 86 at 90.  
41  See McMahon & Saunders, supra note 40 at 144.  




I’m donating an egg. I’ve thought of this as well. It’s not like 
my egg or P’s sperm. It’s our child.”42  
 
As a result of these findings, researchers have 
questioned whether individuals who are planning to use IVF in 
attempt to build their families are in a position to make 
informed decisions prior to undergoing treatment,43 and 
whether such agreements ought to be legally binding.44 This 
research, like all empirical studies, has some methodological 
limitations and may not reflect the experiences of all 
individuals who undergo IVF.45 However, this change in 
decision-making following IVF treatment has been identified in 
studies across different jurisdictions46 and, importantly for the 
                                                
42  See McMahon, “Mothers Conceiving”, supra note 34 at 133. 
43  See e.g. Brandon J Bankowski et al, “The Social Implications of 
Embryo Cryopreservation” (2005) 84:4 Fertility and Sterility 823 at 
827-828; AD Lyerly, “Decisional Conflict and the Disposition of 
Frozen Embryos: Implications for Informed Consent” (2011) 26 
Human Reproduction 646 at 650.  
44  For a critique of using these consent forms in the United States see 
Deborah L Forman, “Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic 
Consent Forms are not the Answer” (2011) 24 J Am Acad 
Matrimonial Law 57.  
45  For instance, as is common with social science literature, these 
studies acknowledge their limitations with respect to sample size, 
potential biases, and other factors that might have influenced their 
results. These limitations may be particularly prevalent with respect 
to empirical research on assisted reproductive technologies; given the 
secrecy that traditionally surrounded the use of ARTs, as well as the 
criminalization of payment in return for reproductive materials in 
Canada, many people may be unwilling to discuss their experiences, 
and those who are keen to have their voices be heard might be those 
who are predisposed to hold certain views.  
46  See e.g. Blyth, supra note 28 (which summarizes findings across 
different jurisdictions). 




purposes of this article, this trend has been studied and 
identified in Canada as well.47  
 
Counselling and Legal Advice 
 
Canadians also may not be currently receiving adequate 
information about the potential consequences of the consent 
forms or agreements they are signing. Under the AHR Consent 
Regulations, donors must be informed in writing about how 
their embryos will be used, and the manner and period of time 
in which they may withdraw their consent.48 In turn, Quebec’s 
Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation specifies that a 
physician or health professional must inform IVF patients 
about the possibility that the number of embryos produced will 
exceed their reproductive needs and the need to plan, along 
with their spouse, as to how they should be disposed of.49 
However, it is unclear how much time clinics or hospitals take 
to explain their consent forms to patients, and also whether 
patients are being provided with sufficient information about 
these consent forms’ potential legal implications.  
 
Counselling and legal advice for individuals who 
create or donate embryos is not legally required, despite being 
highly encouraged or required by some clinics, and will 
increase the substantial costs already associated with IVF.50 
Prior provisions of the AHRA had required that counselling 
                                                
47  See Newton, “Changes”, supra note 29.  
48  AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 5, s 12.  
49  Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 12, s 20(8). 
50  With the exception of Quebec where IVF is covered. However, even 
in the case of Quebec, while some clinics provide a complementary 
counselling session this is not required. See Stefanie Carsley, 
“Funding In Vitro Fertilization: Exploring the Health and Justice 
Implications of Quebec’s Policy” (2012) 20:3 Health Law Review 15 
at 24. 




services be made available to individuals donating reproductive 
materials or in vitro embryos and that licensees ensure that 
donors receive these services. However, in the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s 2010 decision in Reference Re Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act the Court struck down these provisions, 
having found that they were ultra vires federal jurisdiction.51 
Quebec’s Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation currently 
states that physicians must inform patients about “the 
availability of psychological support at the centre.”52 However, 
in many cases patients will need to pay to receive this 
counselling, which might discourage them from receiving 
needed support.53  
 
While clinics may purport to provide patients with 
information about their legal rights and obligations with regard 
to any surplus embryos, this information may be inadequate. 
For instance, an Ottawa fertility clinic’s information pamphlet 
indicates that the woman for whom the embryos were created 
and any partner must “provide for disposition of any embryos 
that are not used for the purpose of attempting to initiate a 
pregnancy, in case of any subsequent change to [their] health or 
marital status” and explains that donors have the right to 
modify this choice at any point in the future by withdrawing 
their consent in writing.54 However, this pamphlet does not 
clarify that spouses would need to jointly decide to change their 
decision. Thus, for instance, a woman who indicates on the 
consent form that the embryos may be donated to a third-party 
in the event that she and her spouse separate may not, in fact, 
                                                
51  AHRA, supra note 4, s 14; Reference Re AHRA, supra note 13.   
52  See Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 12, s 
20(12).  
53  See Carsley, supra note 50 at 24.  
54  Ottawa Fertility Centre, “Patient Information Kit: Freezing Human 
Embryos After In Vitro Fertilization” online: 
<http://www.conceive.ca>. 




ever have the ability to change her mind, should her spouse 
refuse to modify his consent. This clinic also explains that 
“legal principles and requirements around embryo freezing 
have not been firmly established” and that it is the “couple’s 
responsibility to seek legal advice where legal ownership [of 
the embryos] may be in question.”55 
 
Pressure to Begin Treatment 
 
Women who are eager to start the IVF process may also not be 
in a position to fully contemplate the outcomes of signing these 
agreements. Usually IVF represents a last attempt for opposite-
sex couples to have a genetic child. They turn to IVF after they 
have already unsuccessfully attempted to conceive through 
intercourse for over a year and often after they have already 
tried other less invasive methods of assisted procreation, such 
as artificial insemination. In addition, because a woman’s 
chances of conceiving continue to decrease as she ages,56 
women may feel pressure to undergo IVF as quickly as 
possible, and may not be willing or feel able to take the time to 
consider the implications of an embryo disposition agreement.  
 
The case of Roman v. Roman demonstrates this 
potential issue. The Court of Appeals of Texas upheld a clinic 
consent form that allowed for a couple’s embryos to be 
destroyed in the event of a disagreement. Mrs. Roman wished 
to use them for reproduction, and had not yet had a chance to 
undergo a first round of IVF, as her husband withdrew his 
consent following the extraction and fertilization of her eggs, 
on the night prior to her scheduled implantation. Mrs. Roman 
testified that while she signed the agreement, “she would have 
signed anything to move forward because her goal was to have 
                                                
55  Ibid.  
56  See e.g. James P Toner, “Age = Egg Quality, FSH Level = Egg 
Quantity” (2003) 79:3 Fertility and Sterility 491.  




a child” and that she and her ex-husband never discussed the 
prospect of divorce or what would happen to their embryos in 
the event they should disagree.57 
 
Donors might also understand the legal implications of 
these consent forms but give in to their spouse or partner’s 
requests or demands simply because they wish to begin the IVF 
process. For instance, the decision of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court in K.D. v. N.D. demonstrates that one spouse 
may decide to sign an embryo disposition agreement that does 
not reflect his or her wishes. In this case, a couple signed an 
agreement prior to undergoing IVF that clarified that in the 
event they should disagree or divorce, “custody” over the 
embryos would be decided in court. While their clinic’s 
standard consent form would have given Mrs. K.D. control 
over the embryos, Mr. N.D. had revised the agreement without 
consulting her and then asked for her signature. She complied, 
even though she claimed that she was unhappy about the 
modification.58 Their marriage deteriorated, and at the time of 
divorce she initially sought an order that she be given control 
over the embryos. However, by the time of the divorce trial the 
parties had agreed that the embryos would be destroyed. Thus 
the Court was not asked to determine the validity of their prior 
agreement, but rather simply granted the order that Mr. N.D. 
requested: that the embryos “be destroyed in a manner 
acceptable to K.D.” and that she be required to provide proof 
that the embryos have been destroyed.59 The Judge did not 
inquire into the circumstances under which Mrs. K.D. signed 
the original agreement, or question what caused her to change 
her mind and give in to her ex-husband’s request to have the 
embryos destroyed. 
 
                                                
57  Roman v Roman, 193 SW 3d 40 (2006) at 15 [Roman]. 
58  KD v ND, 2009 BCSC 995 at para 17.  
59  Ibid at para 180.  




The experiences of individuals and couples who 
undergo in vitro fertilization combined with the potential lack 
of counselling and legal advice for couples making embryo 
disposition decisions, thus raises questions about whether 
contracts signed prior to a woman undergoing IVF should be 
given legal weight. If donors were unable to contemplate the 
effects of these agreements or how they might later feel about 
their decision, then they were not in a position to make 
enlightened, informed choices regarding embryo disposition. It 
is also not clear to what extent these consent forms or 
agreements reflect the autonomous wishes of spouses. Given 
that spouses need to decide, from the outset, as to how embryos 
should be disposed of at a later date, if they disagree at the time 
of the contract’s creation one spouse is likely to bend to the 
wishes of the other in order to proceed with treatment. In light 
of these circumstances, enforcing agreements may run directly 
counter to the intentions of the AHRA and Quebec’s Regulation 
Respecting Assisted Procreation to ensure that embryos are 
only used or donated in circumstances where donors have 
provided free and informed consent.60   
 
Legally Enforceable Agreements 
 
Canadian law and public policy resists applying a traditional 
contract model to a variety of family law agreements, in part 
because of concerns about whether parties are in a position, at 
the time of these agreements’ creation, to provide free and 
informed consent. For instance, while Canadian courts have 
emphasized the importance of upholding domestic contracts 
between spouses, these agreements may be potentially set-aside 
in circumstances where an arm’s length commercial contract 
would not be subject to judicial interference.61  
                                                
60  AHRA, supra note 4, s 2(d); Regulation Respecting Assisted 
Procreation, supra note 12, s 19.  
61  For instance, in Miglin v Miglin, the Supreme Court of Canada made 
clear that in assessing the weight to be given to an agreement that 





Canadian legislation and jurisprudence also 
demonstrates that surrogacy contracts are not to be treated the 
same as commercial agreements.62 For instance, Quebec, 
Alberta and British Columbia’s family law legislation makes 
clear that these agreements are not legally enforceable and do 
not constitute valid consent to relinquish a child.63 In order for 
                                                                                           
limits spousal support under the Divorce Act, a court need not look 
for “unconscionability” to set aside the agreement or modify its 
intended outcome. See Miglin v Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 SCR 
303 [Miglin]; See also Campbell, “Averting Misconceptions”, supra 
note 18 at 17-18. Note, however, that in Miglin the Court decided to 
uphold the agreement that was at issue and set quite a high threshold 
for judicial intervention in domestic contracts. For commentary on 
this case, see e.g. Carol J Rogerson, “They are Agreements 
Nonetheless:  Case Comment on Miglin v. Miglin” (2003) 20 Can J 
Fam L 197.  
62  Under a surrogacy agreement, a woman agrees – prior to conception 
– to carry a baby for another couple and if the pregnancy is successful 
to give up the child following the birth. Some of these agreements 
may also set out the surrogate and intending parents’ mutual 
expectations and aspirations with regard to the surrogate’s lifestyle 
choices during pregnancy, doctors visits and the reimbursement of 
her expenses. See e.g. Shireen Kashmeri, Unravelling Surrogacy in 
Ontario, Canada: An Ethnographic Inquiry on the Influence of 
Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2004) on Surrogacy 
Contracts, Parentage Laws, and Gay Fatherhood (MA Thesis, 
Concordia University, 2008) at 68 [unpublished].  
63  Surrogacy agreements are “absolutely null” under article 541 of the 
Civil Code of Québec. This reflects the view, unique to Quebec, that 
even altruistic surrogate motherhood violates public order. See 
Angela Campbell, “Law’s Suppositions about Surrogacy against the 
Backdrop of Social Science” (2012) 43:1 Ottawa L Rev 29 at 50; 
Civil Code of Québec, SQ 1991, c 64, art 541 [CCQ]; Alberta’s 
Family Law Act similarly states that an agreement in which a 
surrogate consents to relinquish a child to intending parents is not 
enforceable, but may potentially provide evidence of intending 
parents’ consent to parent a child born through surrogacy. Family 




intending parents to acquire parental rights to the exclusion of a 
surrogate mother, a surrogate must consent to give up the child, 
and her parental rights, following the child’s birth.64 Prior 
jurisprudence also suggests that Canadian courts would be 
unwilling to force a surrogate to give up a child against her 
wishes, even in those provinces that do not have explicit 
legislative provisions declaring that that surrogacy contracts are 
unenforceable. Canadian courts have not yet needed to contend 
with a custodial contest between a surrogate and intending 
parents as the only Canadian surrogacy dispute was never 
reported as going to trial.65 However, in cases where surrogates 
                                                                                           
Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 8.2(8) [Alberta FLA]; British 
Columbia’s Family Law Act also states that an agreement “to act as a 
surrogate or to surrender a child” does not constitute consent to give 
up a child, but “may be used as evidence of the parties’ intentions 
with respect to the child’s parentage if a dispute arises after the 
child’s birth.” Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 29(6) [BC FLA]; It 
should also be noted, however, that some scholars have suggested 
that surrogacy agreements ought to be enforceable, despite these 
laws. See e.g. Louise Langevin, “Réponse Jurisprudentielle à la 
Pratique des Mères Porteuses au Québec; Une Difficile 
Réconciliation” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 171.  
64  Note however that in Quebec, a surrogate’s consent may not even be 
sufficient. Intending parents are only able to receive legal recognition 
by obtaining a special consent adoption under article 555 CCQ, and 
case law has demonstrated that while some judges have been willing 
to allow for these adoptions, others have not because this has been 
viewed as circumventing article 541 CCQ which states that surrogacy 
agreements are null and void. See CCQ supra note 63, arts 541, 555; 
Adoption –091, 2009 QCCQ 628, [2009] RJQ 445 (where a judge 
refused to allow for a special consent adoption, even where the birth 
mother consented); But see Adoption — 09184, 2009 QCCQ 9058, 
[2009] RJQ 2694, Adoption — 09367, 2009 QCCQ 16815, [2010] 
RDF 387, and most recently, Adoption —1445, 2014 QCCA 1162  
(where Quebec judges have been willing to allow intending parents to 
adopt a child born through surrogacy). 
65  W(HL) v T(JC), 2005 BCSC 1679.  




and intending parents agreed that the intending parents would 
have sole custody, Canadian judges have nonetheless noted that 
they were able to transfer parental rights to intending parents in 
part because the surrogate consented, following the birth, to not 
be considered the child’s legal parent.66  
 
Canadian adoption law statutes also do not permit 
women to provide binding consent to an adoption prior to 
giving birth and also provide birth parents with a period of time 
in which they may revoke their consent. Provincial statutes 
across Canada make very clear that consent to adoption is only 
valid if it is given in writing,67 following the birth of the child, 
and often following a specific number of days stipulated in 
each province’s adoption legislation. For example, British 
Columbia’s Adoption Act clarifies that a birth mother’s consent 
will only be valid if it is given at least ten days after the child’s 
birth,68 whereas in Ontario birth parents’ consent may only be 
given once the child is seven days old.69 A birth mother is also 
given the opportunity to revoke her consent up to a certain 
point after the child’s birth. For instance, in British Columbia 
                                                
66  See e.g. R(J) v H(L), [2002] OJ No 3998 (where the court granted the 
intending parents’ application to declare the gestational carrier not to 
be the mother of the twins she carried, but where Justice Kiteley 
noted that had the surrogate opposed this application, this could have 
posed a problem); See WJQM v AMA, 2011 SKQB 317, 339 DLR 
(4th) 759 (where the court noted that Mary, the surrogate mother, 
“does not view herself as Sarah’s mother and supports the petitioners’ 
application to remove her name from that designation on Sarah’s 
registration of live birth”). 
67  Different provinces have different formalities for providing written 
consent. For instance, British Columbia requires birth parents to fill 
out certain forms. Adoption Regulation, BC Reg 291/96, s 9; Quebec 
requires that consent be given in writing before two witnesses. CCQ, 
supra note 63, art 548.  
68  Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5, s 14 [BC Adoption Act]. 
69  Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C11, s 137(3) [CFSA]. 




and Quebec the period of time for revocation is 30 days after 
consent was given.70 In Ontario it is 21 days.71 If consent is 
withdrawn during the revocation period, then the child must be 
returned; however, if the period of time has elapsed, then the 
child is to remain with his adoptive family, subject to some 
exceptions.72 Any agreements, verbal or written, that were 
created prior to these statutory time periods are not legally 
binding.  
 
In each of these contexts, the law recognizes that 
agreements between spouses or between a pregnant woman and 
third parties ought not to be treated the same as other contracts, 
because of the nature of these agreements and the 
circumstances in which they were created. The lower threshold 
for judicial intervention in the context of domestic agreements, 
as compared to commercial contracts, reflects the law’s 
recognition that these agreements may be negotiated in 
emotional circumstances and may reflect power imbalances 
between spouses or partners.73 In the context of adoption and 
surrogacy, Canadian laws recognize that a surrogate or a birth 
mother may change her mind and wish to keep the child she 
has carried following pregnancy and childbirth, and that where 
a woman does give up a child, it should be in circumstances 
where she has been given the time to reflect upon this decision 
and is given the opportunity to make an informed and 
autonomous decision. Laws relating to adoption and surrogate 
motherhood also arguably reflect a desire under Canadian 
public policy to protect women’s reproductive autonomy and to 
                                                
70  CCQ, supra note 63, art 557; BC Adoption Act, supra note 68, s 19.  
71  See CFSA, supra note 69, s 137(8). 
72  For example, the Civil Code of Québec explains that if a birth parent 
fails to revoke consent within 30 days he or she may nonetheless 
apply to a court to have the child returned before the order of 
placement. CCQ, supra note 63, art 558.  
73  See e.g. Miglin, supra note 61 at paras 74-75.  




prevent the commercialization of reproduction.74 They seek to 
preclude third parties from making decisions that will 
determine whether a woman may raise the child she has carried 
and to prevent children from being treated as commodities than 
can be exchanged on the market.75 These laws also demonstrate 
an intention to ensure that a child’s interests are given priority; 
Canadian courts consider the best interest of the child in 
determining who ought to be a child’s legal parents, regardless 
of any existing agreements.76  
 
These agreements are not entirely analogous to embryo 
disposition agreements. Unlike marriage, cohabitation or 
separation agreements, embryo disposition contracts or consent 
forms do not deal with financial obligations, the distribution of 
property or custody and access with regard to children.77 
Canadian law makes clear that embryos are not “persons” and 
thus are not children,78 and it would be inconsistent with the 
                                                
74  See e.g. AHRA, supra note 4, s 6 (which prohibits commercial 
surrogacy); BC Adoption Act, supra note 68, s 84 (which prohibits 
giving or receiving payment for an adoption). See also Campbell, 
“Law’s Suppositions”, supra note 63 at 48-51 (which explains that 
some of the concerns driving the AHRA and the Civil Code of 
Québec’s responses to surrogacy were related to the commodification 
of human life, concerns about women’s reproductive autonomy and 
informed consent). 
75  The issues associated with treating embryos as property are discussed 
in more detail later on in this article. 
76  See e.g. Adoption —1445, supra note 64; WRL v CDG, [1994] MJ No 
152; WW v XX, [2013] OJ No 600; MAC v MK, 2009 ONCJ 18, 
[2009] OJ No 368.  
77  Note that marriage contracts and cohabitation agreements, however, 
may not deal with custody and access. See e.g. Family Law Act, RSO 
1990, c F3, s 52-53.  
78  See e.g. Daigle v Tremblay, [1989] 2 SCR 530 [Daigle] (where the 
Supreme Court held that a fetus is not a human being and thus does 
not enjoy a “right to life” under Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights 




Assisted Human Reproduction Act, which prohibits the 
commercialization of reproductive material,79 to treat embryos 
the same as other property that may be negotiated for, 
contracted over and bought and sold. Domestic agreements also 
do not seek to make decisions that may ultimately determine 
whether one party may be able to reproduce and raise a child. 
In turn, unlike a surrogate or birth mother, a woman who 
donates or destroys her embryos in accordance with a clinic 
consent form or spousal agreement does not give up a child she 
has carried and birthed. 
 
However, embryo disposition agreements nonetheless 
raise similar issues as domestic contracts, surrogacy contracts, 
and adoption agreements. Agreements or consent forms setting 
out spouses’ intentions regarding their embryos may also be 
signed in emotional circumstances, and may not reflect both 
parties’ wishes. Embryo donors, much like surrogates or birth 
mothers, may change their minds regarding whether they 
would like to donate their embryos – and thus give up an 
opportunity to have and raise a child – after they experience 
pregnancy and childbirth. In turn, embryo disposition 
agreements, much like surrogacy contracts or adoption 
                                                                                           
and Freedoms); Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest 
Area) v G(DF), [1997] 3 SCR 925 (which confirmed that a fetus or 
unborn child is not a person who possesses legal rights under 
common law). A fetus is defined as “a human organism during the 
period of its development beginning on the fifty-seventh day 
following fertilization or creation, excluding any time during which 
its development has been suspended, and ending at birth.” AHRA, 
supra note 4, s 3. An in vitro embryo is less developed as it is not 
permitted to remain outside of a human body for longer than fourteen 
days following fertilization or creation unless its development is 
suspended through cryopreservation or vitrification. See AHRA, supra 
note 4, s 5(d). Thus if a fetus is not a person, then by extension an 
embryo also does not have legal personhood status.  
79  AHRA, supra note 4, s 7. 




agreements, seek to restrict or control a woman’s ability to 
reproduce or her choice to carry and/or raise her genetic 
children, and thus are arguably problematic on grounds of 
public policy.  
 
This article contends that given these similarities, 
embryo disposition agreements ought not to be treated the same 
as binding contracts and should be legally unenforceable. The 
threshold for judicial interference in relation to domestic 
contracts seems too high for embryo disposition agreements 
given that they involve decisions regarding women’s 
reproduction. Moreover, much like surrogacy contracts or pre-
birth agreements to relinquish a child for adoption, these 
contracts may be executed at a time when women do not have 
sufficient information in order to make free and informed 
decisions regarding the disposition of their embryos.  
 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF JOINT CONSENT AND 
CONTROL 
 
Even if embryo disposition agreements are not treated as 
legally binding, federal and Quebec provincial laws and 
regulations would still apply to mandate that spouses have joint 
control over these embryos and that one party may revoke his 
or her consent prior to embryo implantation. Under section 8 of 
the AHRA and its AHR Consent Regulations, if spouses used 
their own genetic material in order to create embryos for 
reproduction, these spouses are jointly considered the embryo 
“donor” and their embryos cannot be used and cannot be 
donated without their mutual consent, even if they divorce or 
separate.80 If one spouse is unwilling to consent to use or 
donate the couple’s surplus embryos, the embryos will either 
have to remain in storage or can potentially be destroyed.  
 
                                                
80  AHRA, supra note 4, s 8(3); AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 5, 
ss 10(1), 10(2).  




What happens to these embryos if one spouse 
withdraws his or her consent might depend upon whether 
spouses are within or outside of Quebec. Quebec’s Regulation 
Respecting Assisted Procreation has the added requirement that 
spouses mutually consent to embryos being destroyed,81 and 
also states that if both parties fail to make contact with a 
fertility centre for over five years to re-express their intentions 
regarding their embryos, the centre may dispose of them as it 
wishes.82 Thus Quebec’s Regulation provides a default that 
appears to contradict the AHRA’s provisions: Quebec clinics 
are authorized to donate or destroy embryos even without 
parties consenting to dispose of them in that manner.  
 
What is most important for the purposes of this article, 
however, is that in Quebec and across Canada, the AHRA’s 
provisions regarding joint consent and unilateral revocation 
may have the effect of preventing one spouse from using 
embryos they have created for reproductive purposes. In the 
Nott case discussed in the introduction to this paper, even if 
Mr. and Mrs. Nott had not signed an agreement stating that 
their embryos may be destroyed, Mrs. Nott would still be 
unable to use the embryos to reproduce without her former 
husband’s consent.  
 
                                                
81  See Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 12, s 
19(3). It should be noted that the regulations do not use the term 
“destroy”, but rather “dispose of” which might be thought to connote 
donation as well as destruction; however, the French version uses the 
language “élimination” suggesting that what they intended was 
destruction.  
82  Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 12, s 24; 
Quebec’s Regulation also requires that spouses must jointly contact a 
centre once a year to re-express their intentions regarding the freezing 
and storage of their embryos. See Regulation Respecting Assisted 
Procreation, supra note 12, s 23.  




In addition, the AHRA also seems to enable a male 
spouse, like Mr. Nott, to not only revoke his consent years after 
the embryos’ creation, but also immediately after, providing he 
withdraws his consent prior to the embryos being implanted. 
Embryo implantation occurs 2-5 days after embryos are 
created.83 It is thus possible – as is evidenced in jurisprudence 
from the United States84 – for a male spouse to revoke his 
consent midway through the first IVF cycle, after his spouse 
has already undergone fertility treatment and ova extraction, 
but just prior to implantation.  
  
These laws providing spouses with joint control seem 
to be based on the idea that as co-genetic contributors, men and 
women ought to have an equal say in what becomes of their 
embryos. It seems that in allowing one party to withdraw his or 
her consent, these provisions also reflect the view that one 
spouse should not be forced to procreate or be a parent against 
his or her wishes. 
 
This approach, much like the contractual approach 
discussed in Part I, has received support as well as criticism 
from Canadian scholars. For instance, Jennifer Nedelsky has 
pointed out that allowing both partners to make decisions 
regarding their embryos might be desirable because “we think a 
sense of attachment and concern about the potential life one 
shared in creating is appropriate” and because “we might well 
judge that this sense of attachment should be honoured even in 
the form of permitting one partner to refuse to allow the 
potential life to develop into a child under circumstances over 
                                                
83  See e.g. Manon Ceelen et al, “Growth and Development of Children 
Born After In Vitro Fertilization” (2008) 90:5 Fertility and Sterility 
1662 at 1662; Charles P Kindregan Jr & Maureen McBrien, Assisted 
Reproductive Technology: A Lawyer’s Guide to Emerging Law and 
Science, 2nd ed (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2011) at 92-93. 
84  See Roman, supra note 57.  




which he or she could have no control.”85 Christine Overall, 
Roxanne Mykitiuk and Albert Wallrap, however, have pointed 
out that an approach which privileges joint control over 
embryos does not recognize the potential power imbalances 
between men and women and the fact that women undergo 
invasive treatment in order to create their embryos.86  
  
The following section takes up the latter position and 
suggests that an approach that requires joint consent and which 
allows for unilateral revocation does not adequately account for 
the health effects of IVF, the biological differences between 
men and women and the high costs of in vitro fertilization 
treatment. These factors call into question the idea that men 
and women ought to have joint control. While both parties may 
have contributed genetically to the creation of embryos, their 
contribution to the process of IVF is not equal and these laws 
disproportionately disadvantage women.   
 
Equitable Contribution and Effects? 
 
Health Effects of IVF  
 
Allowing a man to prevent a woman from using embryos for 
reproduction ignores the health risks and effects women endure 
as part of the IVF process. Women who undergo IVF subject 
themselves to an invasive and risky procedure in order to 
cultivate their limited number of ova to create embryos.87 They 
                                                
85  See Nedelsky, supra note 18 at 361. She also points out: “A sense of 
concern and responsibility for the future of the children one has 
participated in bringing into the world may, however, be thought to 
be grounds for granting even a ‘vetopower’ of joint control.” 
86  See Overall, supra note 18 at 187-191; Mykitiuk & Wallrap, supra 
note 18 at 415.  
87  See Mykitiuk & Wallrap, supra note 18 at 415; Overall, supra note 
18 at 187-191.  




are typically required to take hormone medication in order to 
stimulate their ovaries to produce multiple oocytes. When the 
ova are ready to be retrieved, a physician uses an ultrasound 
probe to remove them, by directing a needle through the 
vaginal wall into the ovarian follicles. The eggs that are 
successfully retrieved are then fertilized in a Petri dish in order 
to create embryos for implantation.88  
 
Studies are mixed on the adverse health risks of IVF 
for women, with some indicating that women undergoing IVF 
treatment have an increased risk of blood clots, ectopic 
pregnancies, preeclampsia and placental separation.89 It is 
clear, however, that the fertility drugs used to stimulate 
women’s ovaries may result in ovarian hyperstimulation 
syndrome, which is estimated to affect between 1-10% of 
women undergoing IVF treatment.90 This condition, in which 
fertility medications cause patients to produce too many eggs, 
is potentially life threatening.91  
                                                
88  See e.g. Ceelen, supra note 83 at 1662; Kindregan, supra note 83 at 
92-93.  
89  See e.g. Tarek A Gelbaya, “Short and Long-Term Risks to Women 
who Conceive Through In Vitro Fertilization” (2010) 13:1 Human 
Fertility 19 at 19. 
90  See Margarida Avo Santos, Ewart W Kuijk & Nick S Macklon, “The 
Impact of Ovarian Stimulation for IVF on the Developing Embryo” 
(2010) 139 Reproduction 23 at 25; William M Buckett et al, 
“Obstetric Outcomes and Congenital Abnormalities After In Vitro 
Maturation, In Vitro Fertilization, and Intracytoplasmic Sperm 
Injection” (2007) 110:4 Obstetrics & Gynecology 885 at 885; See 
Justin J Madill, Neil B Mullen & Benjamin P Harrison, “Ovarian 
Hyperstimulation Syndrome: A Potentially Fatal Complication of 
Early Pregnancy” (2008) 35:3 The Journal of Emergency Medicine 
283 at 283.  
91  Common side effects include rapid weight gain, difficulty breathing, 
abdominal pain and vomiting, but this may also result in more serious 
complications such as kidney failure, blood clots and death. See e.g. 





The purpose of creating and freezing surplus embryos 
is to reduce the number of times a woman will need to undergo 
ovarian stimulation and egg cultivation procedures because of 
the risks and discomfort associated with this process. Denying 
a woman the ability to use these embryos frustrates these 
intentions, as it would compel her to undergo an additional 
round of unnecessary medical treatment, providing she is able 
to physically or financially afford to undertake an additional 
IVF cycle.  
 
Biological Differences  
 
Laws mandating that spouses provide joint consent to use their 
embryos also do not recognize that because of biological 
differences between men and women, a couple’s frozen 
embryos may represent a woman’s best or only chance of 
conceiving. In the absence of a medical condition, men can 
continue to produce viable sperm at a much older age than 
women can produce ova. Women’s eggs become less viable as 
they age and thus women may be less likely to conceive using 
newly created embryos, than ones that had been frozen 
previously. Women also may be at higher risk of complications 
if they retrieve their eggs at a later age, as they will be required 
to take increased hormone medication to stimulate their 
ovaries.92  Thus even if a woman is willing to undergo further 
                                                                                           
The Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, “Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome” (2008) 90 Fertility 
and Sterility S188 at S189; Gelbaya, supra note 89 at 20; Madill, 
supra note 90 at 285. See also Alison Motluk, “‘I thought I just had to 
sleep it off’: Egg donor sues Toronto fertility doctor after suffering 
stroke”, National Post (March 28 2013) A5.  
 
92  See e.g. Toner, supra note 56; See also Sharon Kirkey, “Freezing the 
tick tick tock of the biological clock”, The Ottawa Citizen (17 
January 2011) A1; Sarah Boseley, “High Doses of IVF Drugs May 




rounds of IVF because she is unable to use the embryos she has 
in storage, she may no longer be able to use her own eggs 
successfully in order to conceive. She would also, of course, 
need to find a new partner or use donated sperm in order to 
create new embryos for IVF.  
 
While allowing either spouse to withdraw his or her 
consent may affect both male and female spouses, overall these 
laws are likely to have disproportionate effects on women. 
Given the fact that men do not undergo invasive treatment to 
create embryos and may also have a greater chance of 
conceiving at an older age, it seems that they will be more 
likely willing to revoke their consent than women. 
Jurisprudence from within and outside of Canada supports this 
theory. Among fourteen judicial decisions involving disputes 
between spouses in Canada, the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Israel, only one involved a case where a woman 
withdrew her consent to use the embryos while her former 
husband wanted to use them with a surrogate.93 This potential 
power imbalance between male and female spouses thus 
challenges potential justifications for joint consent grounded in 
the idea that men and women equally contribute to the creation 
of these embryos and thus should have an equal say in whether 
they are used for procreative purposes.  
 
 
Costs of IVF 
 
Allowing one party to revoke his or her consent and requiring 
that the embryos either remain in storage or be destroyed also 
ignores the costs of IVF. Only Quebec currently provides 
                                                                                           
Cause Harm to Eggs”, The Guardian (4 July 2011) online: The 
Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/>. 
93  In Re Marriage of Nash, 150 Wash App 1029, 2009 WL 1514842 
(2009) [Nash] (citing to unpublished lower court decision). 




publicly funded in vitro fertilization;94 in the remaining 
provinces these services are a significant investment for many 
couples and beyond the means of many Canadians. For 
instance, one basic cycle costs approximately $6,000 plus 
anywhere between $2,500-7,000 for medications.95 Given the 
relatively low success rate of IVF,96 many couples will also 
need to undergo more than one cycle in order to potentially 
conceive. As a result, if one spouse withdraws his or her 
consent and the other spouse still wishes to have more children, 
that spouse may be unable to afford further rounds of in vitro 
treatment.  
In addition, where one spouse withdraws his or her 
consent, this may also result in added costs and expenses. For 
instance, if a woman is required to use donated eggs and/or 
sperm because her partner has revoked his consent, this will 
                                                
94  See Carsley, supra note 50; The Ontario government announced in 
April 2014 that it would fund one cycle of in-vitro fertilization; 
however, it has yet to be seen whether it will deliver on this promise. 
See e.g. Tom Blackwell, “Ontario to fund in-vitro fertilization with a 
caveat – one embryo at a time to cut risky multiple births” National 
Post (9 April 2014), online: The National Post 
<http://news.nationalpost.com/>. It should also be noted that at the 
time of editing this article in 2014, the Quebec government was 
discussing abolishing or restricting its funding for IVF. See e.g. 
Amélie Daoust-Boisvert, “Inquiétudes devant la fin possible de la 
gratuité” Le Devoir (25 Juin 2014), online:  <http://m.ledevoir.com/>. 
95  Ovo Consulting, In-Vitro Fertilisation in Canada: Cost Structure 
Analysis (Montreal: Ovo Consulting, 2009) at 11, 14-15, online: 
Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society <http://www.cfas.ca >. 
96  In 2010, live birth rates ranged on average between 27% to 31% 
depending on the type of cycle performed (e.g. started IVF cycle or 
frozen embryo transfer). They also differed dramatically depending 
on the patient’s age, for instance with only 11% of women 40 or over 
having given birth to a live baby through IVF. See “Assisted Human 
Reproduction Live Birth Rates for Canada”, online: Canadian 
Fertility and Andrology Society <http://www.cfas.ca>. 




increase the costs associated with these treatments. IVF clinics 
charge increased fees for using donated genetic material,97 and 
while Canada has banned payment for sperm and eggs, 
individuals who need to use donations often turn to the United 
States to purchase gametes, as the restrictions on payment in 
Canada has resulted in a shortage of donors.98 In turn, storing 
in vitro embryos also costs several hundred dollars per year.99 
Thus if the AHRA mandates that embryos remain in storage 
until a couple can come to a decision, this too can lead to 
further costs, as well as conflicts between spouses regarding 
who ought to be paying for these storage fees.  
 
Revoking Consent to Procreate or Parent 
 
In other contexts where there may be conflicts between spouses 
with regard to one party’s desire to procreate or be a parent, 
Canadian law has acknowledged power imbalances between 
men and women and has refused to recognize a right not to 
procreate or parent. Currently under Canadian law a man does 
not have a legal right to revoke his consent to procreate where 
a child is conceived through intercourse. In other words, he 
cannot legally prevent a woman from giving birth to a child 
conceived from his genetic material, even should he not wish, 
or have never intended, to have genetic offspring. Canadian 
jurisprudence makes explicit that a woman’s decision to have 
                                                
97  See e.g. Ottawa Fertility Centre, online: <http://www.conceive.ca/>. 
98  See e.g. Nicholas Bala & Christine Ashbourne, “The Widening 
Concept of “Parent” in Canada: Step-Parents, Same-Sex Partners & 
Parents by ART” (2012) 20:3 Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the 
Law 525 at 547; Jocelyn Downie & Françoise Baylis, “Transnational 
Trade in Human Eggs: Law, Policy and (In)Action in Canada” (2013) 
41:1 Journal of Medicine, Law and Ethics 224.  
99  For example, at an Ottawa fertility clinic annual freezing costs 300 
dollars per year. See Ottawa Fertility Centre, online: 
<http://www.conceive.ca>. 




an abortion is hers alone to make and that she cannot be 
compelled by the potential child’s father to abort a fetus or, 
conversely, to carry the child to term,100 because to do so 
would interfere with her bodily integrity and reproductive 
choices.   
 
In addition, once a child is born, a man typically does 
not have a right to avoid legal parenthood where he has a 
genetic connection to the child, even if he did not intend to be a 
parent. An exception may exist if he can prove that he and the 
child’s parent(s) had intended for him to be considered a donor 
under the law,101 or that he had not consented to his spouse or 
partner using assisted procreation to conceive a child.102  This 
ability to potentially avoid being considered a parent under the 
law, however, is only set out in some provincial family law 
legislation.103 
 
A man also cannot avoid these parental obligations by 
forcing a birth mother to give up a child for adoption. Birth 
parents are required to jointly consent to an adoption, unless a 
birth parent is not found to have parental status or the capacity 
to consent.104 However, where birth parents disagree and one 
does not provide consent, the effect will be that the dissenting 
parent will be able to keep the child. In other words, should the 
birth father want to relinquish the child for adoption and the 
                                                
100  Daigle, supra note 78; R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30.  
101  See e.g. CCQ, supra note 63, art 538.2; BC FLA, supra note 63, s 24; 
Alberta FLA, supra note 63, s 7(4).  
102  BC FLA, supra note 63, s 27(3). 
103  See Alberta FLA, supra note 63, s 7(4); BC FLA, supra note 63, s 24; 
CCQ, supra note 63, art 538.2; Birth Registration Regulations, NS 
Reg 390/2007, s 3; Child and Family Services Act, RSY 2002, c 31, s 
13(6); Children’s Law Act, RSNL 1990, c C-13, s 12(6).  
104  See e.g. BC Adoption Act, supra note 68, s 13; CCQ, supra note 63, 
art 551-552.   




birth mother would like to keep the child, he will not be able to 
override her wishes – and he will also be liable to pay child 
support. The same would be true in the reverse situation where 
the birth mother wishes to give up the child and the birth father 
does not; he too will not be denied the ability to be a parent.105  
 
These laws relating to abortion, adoption and parentage 
recognize and seek to address the potential power imbalances 
between men and women in relation to reproduction. Laws that 
support a woman’s right to choose whether or not to have a 
baby once pregnant, and which deny a man a say in whether a 
child is born through his genetic material, recognize that 
women should have control over their bodies and should not be 
forced to undergo medical interventions against their wishes. 
Provincial legislation relating to parentage and adoption is 
intended to serve the best interests of the child,106 but also to 
protect birth mothers from being pressured to give up a child 
against their wishes, or from raising a child alone where this 
was not their intention. 
 
There are important legal and social differences 
between the status of an in vitro embryo, an implanted embryo 
or fetus and a child once born. An in vitro embryo does not 
have personhood status,107 and has not yet been implanted in a 
woman’s womb. Thus an embryo does not have legal rights 
                                                
105  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to critique these adoption 
laws, it should be noted that Lori Chambers has argued that the ability 
for birth fathers to override a woman’s ability to give up a child for 
adoption infringes women’s reproductive autonomy. She argues that 
this decision should be a woman’s decision alone to make and that 
joint consent should not be required. See Lori Chambers, “Newborn 
Adoption: Birth Mothers, Genetic Fathers, and Reproductive 
Autonomy” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 339.  
106  See e.g. BC Adoption Act, supra note 68, s 3; CCQ, supra note 63, 
arts 33, 543.  
107  See discussion accompanying note 78, supra.  




and also does not present legal responsibilities for a child’s 
mother, unlike a child who is born alive and viable.108 Because 
in vitro embryos have not yet been implanted, should a man 
revoke his consent to use an embryo, a woman will not be 
required to undergo an abortion. Moreover, currently in 
Canada, frozen embryos may remain in storage indefinitely, 
and may be used years and even decades after they were 
originally frozen.109 Embryos may also – unlike a baby – be 
destroyed or donated to research. As a result, one might argue 
that, within the context of embryo disposition decisions, it 
makes sense for a man to be able to revoke his consent to 
                                                
108  While Canadian civil and common law jurisdictions have adopted 
legal fictions, which permit an unborn child to be accorded certain 
legal rights, the law also makes clear that these rights can only be 
enjoyed if the fetus develops into a child and is born alive and viable. 
For instance, in Montreal Tramways v Léveillé the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that a child, once born, has a right to sue a third party for 
injuries caused to it while in utero. Montreal Tramways Co v Léveillé, 
[1933] SCR 456; Similarly, in Duval v Seguin, the Ontario Supreme 
Court held that a third party owes a duty of care to a child en ventre 
sa mère and can be held liable, following the child’s birth, for 
prenatal injuries caused to the fetus while in the womb. Duval v 
Seguin, [1972] 2 OR 686, 26 DLR (3d) 418, aff’d in (1973), 1 OR 
(2d) 482, 40 DLR (3d) 666; Moreover, in Dobson v Dobson the 
Supreme Court held that a pregnant woman does not owe a duty of 
care to her fetus or subsequently born child and thus that she cannot 
be held liable for injuries caused to her fetus while in utero, because 
of policy concerns with regard to the autonomy and privacy of 
pregnant women and the problems associated with “articulating a 
judicial standard of conduct for pregnant women.” See Dobson 
(Litigation Guardian of) v Dobson, [1999] 2 SCR 753, 174 DLR 
(4th) 1 at para 21.  
109  For instance, it was recently reported that a baby was born in the 
United States using embryos that had been in storage for 19 years. 
See Sarah Elizabeth Richards, “Get used to embryo adoption”, Time 
(24 August 2013), online: Time <http://ideas.time.com/>. 




procreate and for the law to recognize an interest in not being 
forced to procreate against one’s will.110  
 
Yet, despite these differences, similar power dynamics 
exist in the context of embryo disposition, and are exacerbated 
by Canadian laws allowing a man to revoke his consent for 
embryos to be used for reproduction. While an embryo donor is 
not pregnant, she has already undergone invasive and risky 
medical interventions to create these embryos. As discussed 
previously, she will also be required to undergo further rounds 
of treatment should she want to create more embryos in an 
attempt to conceive. It is thus questionable whether the fact that 
the embryos are not yet implanted should justify a man’s 
ability to override his spouse’s desire to use the embryos for 
reproduction. Allowing a man to revoke his consent is 
nonetheless enabling him to interfere with a woman’s body and 
reproductive choices.   
 
In addition, it also seems fair to question whether the 
fact that embryos are frozen in time should make a difference 
with regard to whether an individual will be found to have 
parental obligations. Both individuals did, at one time, consent 
to their genetic material being used in attempt to reproduce and 
both intended to be parents. If they had not, the embryos would 
never have been created, and if the embryos had been 
implanted and resulted in childbirth, both would have been 
parents under the law. It seems problematic that a man can 
revoke his consent where he had previously expressed a clear 
                                                
110  For some examples of scholarship discussing whether United States 
laws support, or ought to support a right not to procreate or parent see 
e.g. I Glenn Cohen, “The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent” (2008) 81 
S Cal L Rev 1115; I Glenn Cohen, “The Constitution and the Rights 
Not to Procreate” (2008) 60 Stan L Rev 135.  
 
 




intention to be a parent and where a woman elected to undergo 
IVF based on the understanding that her spouse or partner 
would be equally responsible for supporting any children 
produced. Given that laws in relation to abortion, adoption and 
parentage recognize the power imbalances between men and 
women with regard to reproduction, arguably the law should 
not be ignoring the ways in which women might be similarly 
vulnerable where they have created embryos for IVF, and also 
should not be serving to exacerbate this vulnerability by 
allowing a man to revoke his previously given consent to 
procreate and to be a parent under the law.  
 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO EMBRYO 
DISPOSITION 
 
In light of the weaknesses identified with current Canadian 
legal approaches to disputes over frozen embryos, this article 
contends that these laws ought to be modified to better account 
for the experiences of individuals who undergo in vitro 
fertilization. This Part considers other existing approaches for 
dealing with disputes between spouses. It explores how judges 
and legislators in other jurisdictions have sought to respond to 
these disputes. It also examines how Canadian courts have 
previously responded to related conflicts between spouses over 
donated sperm, or between an embryo’s genetic contributors 
where the parties were not spouses. It suggests, however, that 
each of these models fails to adequately address the issues 
discussed in Parts I and II of this article and that each of these 
alternative approaches would also conflict with Canadian law 
and public policy relating to assisted procreation. 
 
 
Right Not to Procreate  
 
A major trend in judicial decisions in the United States has 
been to enforce consent forms or contracts between spouses, 
unless these agreements would force one party to procreate 




against their wishes. In other words, courts have been willing 
to uphold agreements mandating that embryos be destroyed in 
the event the parties disagree or divorce. However, they have 
been generally unwilling to enforce agreements that will allow 
for an embryo to be used for procreative purposes in the event 
one party changes his or her mind, on the grounds that this 
“forced procreation” would violate public policy. For example, 
in Kass v. Kass, the Supreme Court of New York upheld an 
agreement that a couple’s surplus embryos would be donated to 
research, despite Mrs. Kass’ wish, at the time of the divorce, to 
use the embryos to have more children.111 In Litowitz v. 
Litowitz, the Supreme Court of Washington similarly enforced 
an agreement that allowed a clinic to destroy a couple’s unused 
embryos despite Mrs. Litowitz’s desire to use the embryos for 
reproduction using a surrogate.112 However, in A.Z. v. B.Z. the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to enforce an agreement 
that said that if the couple separated, the embryos would be 
given to one spouse for implantation. It found that doing so 
would run counter to public policy, as it would mean forcing 
one individual to procreate against his or her wishes.113 J.B. v. 
M.B. involved an alleged oral agreement, corroborated by the 
husband’s family, that surplus embryos would be donated to 
third-parties for reproductive use, as well as a written 
agreement allowing a court to make a determination as to who 
should have control over the embryos in the event the parties 
divorce. The husband wanted the embryos to be donated to 
infertile couples, while the wife did not want them to be used 
                                                
111  Kass v Kass, 696 NE 2d 174 (1998).  
112  Litowitz v Litowitz, 48 P 3d 261 (2002); See also Roman, supra note 
57 (where the Court of Appeals of Texas similarly upheld an 
agreement that stipulated that in the event of a divorce the couples’ 
embryos would be destroyed. It did so even though Mrs. Roman 
wished to use them for reproduction).  
113  AZ v BZ, 725 NE 2d 1051 (2000).  




by anyone for procreative purposes.114 The Supreme Court of 
New Jersey held that the wife’s right not to procreate 
outweighed the husband’s right to procreate and that a contract 
to reproduce is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.115 In 
re Marriage of Dahl and Angle, the Court of Appeals of 
Oregon enforced an agreement, which stipulated that in the 
event the parties divorced the wife would be given control over 
the embryos. The wife wanted the embryos to be destroyed, 
while the husband wanted to donate them for third-party 
reproductive use. In deciding that they could be destroyed, the 
court was privileging the wife’s right not to procreate, and thus 
not to have genetic offspring out in the world, even if they were 
to be born to another couple.116  
 
This trend in United States jurisprudence is effectively 
a combination of the contractual approach and the joint consent 
approach discussed in the first two parts of this article and is 
vulnerable to the same criticisms developed there. It allows for 
contracts to be recognized and enforced providing they allow 
for embryos to be destroyed, donated to research or kept in 
storage. However, it does not allow for parties to contract 
around the requirement that both spouses agree to use the 
embryos for procreation or donate them for third-party 
reproduction. This approach fails to take account of the power 
imbalances that can arise within spousal relationships and 
women’s unique contribution to the creation of the embryos.  
 
The Supreme Court of Iowa has taken a slightly 
different approach towards supporting a right not to procreate. 
In Re Marriage of Witten, a couple had signed an agreement 
stating that their embryos will only be used with their mutual 
                                                
114  JB v MB, 751 A 2d 613 (2000) at 615-616.  
115  Ibid at 619.  
116  In Re Marriage of Dahl and Angle, 222 194 P 3d 834, 222 Or App 
572 (2009). 




consent. Upon divorce, Mrs. Witten asked that she be given 
control over the embryos and expressed that she did not want 
them to be destroyed or given to another couple. Mr. Witten 
was opposed to them being used by Mrs. Witten for 
reproduction and requested an injunction preventing them from 
being transferred, released or used without his consent. The 
Court adopted what has been referred to as the 
“contemporaneous mutual consent approach” and found that 
the embryos would have to remain in storage unless the couple 
could come to an agreement as to how they would be used or 
disposed of.117 This approach is thus very similar to the “joint 
consent” approach set out in section 8 of the AHRA, except that 
in Canada it is still unclear whether parties may contract 
around this approach, and whether embryos may be legally 
destroyed where parties disagree.  
 
Some courts have, in turn, tempered the right not to 
procreate by making an exception where the party who wishes 
to use the embryos would not otherwise be able to conceive. 
For instance in Davis v. Davis, the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee explained that in the absence of an agreement 
between spouses, courts should give priority to the party who 
does not wish to procreate, unless the other spouse will not 
otherwise have a reasonable means of becoming a parent.118 In 
                                                
117  In Re Marriage of Witten, 672 NW 2d 768 (2003).  
118  Davis v Davis, 842 SW 2d 588 (1992) at 21-22. In this case, there 
was no agreement between the parties and by the time it reached the 
Supreme Court Mrs. Davis no longer wanted to use the embryos for 
her own reproductive use and instead wanted to donate them for 
third-party reproductive use. Mr. Davis wanted them to be destroyed. 
The court noted that if Mrs. Davis wanted to use them for her own 
reproduction then it would have been a more difficult decision. 
However, it maintained that she could still undergo another round of 
IVF or adopt, and thus it would not have necessarily privileged her 
desire to use the embryos to have her biological children, or 
recognized the difficulties of undergoing further rounds of IVF.  




Nahmani v. Nahmani the Supreme Court of Israel relied upon 
public policy to support a woman’s “right to reproduce.” It 
found that in this case using the embryos represented Mrs. 
Nahmani’s only chance to achieve biological parenthood and 
that her claim should supersede that of her former husband not 
to reproduce.119 In Re Marriage of Nash, the Court of Appeals 
of Washington upheld the trial judge’s decision to award 
control over the embryos to Mr. Nash who wished to use the 
embryos with a surrogate to have more children. The trial judge 
had been granted authority to decide who would control the 
embryos in the event of a disagreement, and decided in favour 
of Mr. Nash as it found that the “husband’s alternatives to 
achieve parenthood are not reasonable as it would require him 
to restart the expensive process [of IVF] and the success of the 
process is questionable due to his age.”120 Most recently in 
Reber v. Reiss, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania awarded 
embryos to Ms. Reiss because she and Mr. Reber had not 
signed an agreement prior to undergoing IVF, and because 
using the embryos likely represented her only or best means of 
procreating, given her treatment for breast cancer.121  
 
This approach towards resolving disputes is certainly 
preferable to the aforementioned contractual, joint consent or 
strict “right not to procreate” models. It acknowledges the 
potential unjust outcomes of allowing one party to unilaterally 
revoke his or her consent, such as the particular effects this 
may have on women, the costs of IVF, and the fact that without 
using the embryos some individuals will be unable to otherwise 
have children because of biological factors that are beyond 
their control. However, this approach does not seem to go far 
enough. Just because a man or woman might have the ability to 
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create new embryos on account of their age, physical or 
financial situation, does not justify allowing existing embryos 
to be destroyed. The standard for “unreasonableness” in 
jurisprudence from the United States seems too high; it does 
not recognize that a woman will still be required to undergo 
further rounds of invasive and risky egg retrieval procedures 
should she wish to use IVF to have more children. In addition, 
the Nahmani decision is based on the idea that in certain 
circumstances a woman has a legal “right to reproduce.” This 
judicial decision was based upon Jewish law as well as the idea 
that public policy in Israel supports encouraging reproduction 
and parenthood as beneficial for Israeli society.122 It has been 
suggested that a similar “right to reproduce” might exist in 
other jurisdictions;123 however, to date this right has yet to be 
recognized under Canadian law, and at least one Canadian 
scholar has pointed out the problems associated with 
recognizing such a right in the Canadian context.124  
 
Automatic Destruction if Revocation 
 
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act of 1990 (HFEA) mandates that in the event 
one spouse revokes his or her consent, embryos must be 
destroyed.125 Thus even if one spouse has no alternative means 
of reproducing for physical or other reasons, the other spouse 
                                                
122  See Campbell, “Averting Misconceptions”, supra note 18 at 13; 
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123  See Campbell, “Averting Misconceptions”, supra note 18 at 13.  
124  See Laura Shanner, “The Right to Procreate: When Rights Claims 
Have Gone Wrong” (1995) 40 McGill LJ 823.  
125  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 (UK), 1990 c 37, 
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may veto his or her ability to use embryos for reproduction as 
the parties are given joint control over these embryos’ 
disposition. This approach is similar to the Canadian model 
under the AHRA and Quebec’s Regulation Respecting Assisted 
Procreation, except that it makes clear that embryos must be 
destroyed, even if one party seeks to use them for procreation. 
Recall that under Canadian law it is not entirely clear what 
should happen to the embryos in the event of a dispute and if 
agreements are not enforceable. They may need to remain in 
storage until the parties can agree, and this seems to necessarily 
be the case in Quebec where its regulations indicate that both 
parties must consent for embryos to be destroyed.126  
 
Having a “default” of destruction might be a desirable 
solution in the event spouses cannot agree on how their 
embryos should be disposed of and neither wants to use them 
for reproduction. However, allowing for this default even 
where one individual still wishes to use the embryos for 
procreation is problematic for the same reasons outlined in Part 
II of this article.  
 
The potential injustice of this approach is perhaps best 
illustrated by Evans v. United Kingdom.127 In this case, Evans 
and her spouse discovered that she had pre-cancerous tumors 
on her ovaries during preliminary IVF testing. Her eggs were 
then harvested, and fertilized using her husband’s sperm and 
she subsequently had her ovaries removed. However, prior to 
using the embryos for implantation, the couple’s relationship 
deteriorated and her spouse withdrew his consent to store the 
embryos. Under the HFEA their clinic was required to destroy 
the embryos, thus Evans sought an injunction to prevent their 
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destruction. The trial court and Court of Appeal dismissed her 
claim,128 the House of Lords refused her leave to appeal; 
therefore, she appealed to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). The ECHR ultimately upheld the validity of the 
HFEA and found that there was no violation of her rights under 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.129 She was thus unable to use the 
embryos she had created even though it was clear that she 
would have no other way of conceiving. She had already 
decided to have her ovaries removed, based on the 
understanding that she would be able to use the embryos in an 




An additional approach, which derives inspiration from some 
recent judicial decisions in Canada, would be to treat the 
embryos as property. Under this model, a court could divide 
the embryos among divorcing spouses for them to do with 
them as they wish or give them to one spouse to the exclusion 
of the other. A court’s determination could be based on the 
financial value of these embryos and whether one or both 
parties had borne the costs of creating them. Thus for instance, 
if a man had paid for IVF treatments as well as for the 
embryos’ storage, his female spouse would be able to use them 
even if he disagrees, but in return the division of their property 
and assets would reflect the fact that he had paid for these 
treatments. In other words, she would be required to 
compensate him for the costs IVF and storage.  
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While Canadian courts have yet to make a 
determination as to what should happen to embryos in the 
event of a dispute between spouses, they have seen one dispute 
between partners over frozen sperm vials131 and one dispute 
between genetic contributors – who were not spouses – over 
the control of frozen embryos.132 These cases took a similar 
approach in characterizing reproductive materials as property 
and basing their analysis, in part, on the financial value of this 
genetic material.  
 
In C.C. v. A.W., the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
was asked to determine whether a woman could have access to 
embryos without the consent of the male genetic contributor. 
Mr. A.W., a friend and former boyfriend of Ms. C.C., provided 
her with sperm to use for in vitro fertilization. C.C. underwent 
IVF, successfully became pregnant and gave birth to twins. 
Four embryos were frozen and placed in storage, for which 
C.C. paid an annual storage fee. C.C. later sought to use the 
embryos for further IVF cycles but A.W. refused to consent to 
their release.133 The court held that A.W.’s sperm was “an 
unqualified gift given in order to conceive children” and that 
“the remaining fertilized embryos remain her property [and] 
are chattels that can be used as she sees fit.”134 It emphasized 
the fact that A.W. knew that his sperm would be used for 
reproductive purposes, and that C.C. had paid for the embryos’ 
storage.135 
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Some commentators have suggested that the C.C. v. 
A.W. decision may be of limited authoritative value as it was 
decided in 2004 and thus before the AHRA came into force.136 
Others have pointed out that it was nonetheless decided 
following the introduction of the AHRA in 2004, and may run 
counter to it, given that this decision permits the use of 
embryos despite one of the “donors” revoking his consent.137 
These scholars have neglected to mention, however, that if this 
case had been decided today the AHR Consent Regulations, 
which came into force in 2007, would apply and it would have 
been unnecessary to determine that the embryos were C.C.’s 
property.138 Under these Regulations she would have been 
considered the sole donor of the embryos, as A.W. was not her 
spouse or partner at the time of the embryos’ creation. Thus, 
only her consent would have been required in order for her to 
use or dispose of the embryos.139 This case is thus only of 
limited authority in determining whether one spouse or partner 
should be able to override the other’s desire to use embryos for 
reproductive use. However, it indicates one court’s willingness 
to characterize embryos as “property” and thus to potentially 
enable them to be divided among divorcing spouses.  
 
Similarly, while J.C.M. v. A.N.A. dealt with a dispute 
over gametes rather than embryos, it demonstrates that 
Canadian courts have been willing to treat reproductive 
material as property. The British Columbia Supreme Court held 
that frozen sperm vials that had been purchased in the United 
States could be treated as property, and thus could be divided 
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among lesbian partners who had decided to separate.140 The 
court also decided that since there was an uneven number of 
sperm straws, J.C.M. should pay A.N.A. for the additional 
sperm straw she received, and that A.N.A. could sell the 
remaining straws to J.C.M. if she wished to do so.141  
 
Intuitively, this approach might seem like a better 
solution than the aforementioned models. It provides women 
with the possibility of using embryos even without their 
spouse’s consent and even where it is not the case that using 
these embryos would be their only chance of conceiving. 
However, this approach would contravene the express 
provisions and spirit of the AHRA. Section 7 of the AHRA 
criminalizes buying and selling gametes and embryos as it 
seeks to ensure that individuals who donate their reproductive 
material are doing so voluntarily and are not induced to donate 
simply because of the prospect of financial gain.142 While 
under this model embryos would not necessarily be sold to 
third parties, they could nonetheless be exchanged between 
spouses in return for financial compensation, which would still 
contravene the AHRA’s intentions to prevent the 
commodification of reproductive materials and services.143  
 
Treating embryos as property – whether as true 
property which may be exchanged for commercial value, or as 
quasi property that may be controlled by spouses but not traded 
on the market144 – also objectifies women’s bodies, 
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reproductive capacities, and genetic material.145 The AHRA 
makes clear that embryos and gametes are not to be treated like 
other property, and the research restrictions it places upon 
embryos are also based on the idea that as potential human life 
these embryos ought to be accorded a certain measure of 
respect.146 A property model would serve to undermine these 
intentions.  
 
In addition, endorsing a property approach could result 
in these embryos being used as a negotiation tool in 
acrimonious divorces. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in 
which one individual uses his or her spouse’s desire to have 
more children as a means of getting more than their equitable 
share of their property and assets. Most case law that has 
involved disputes over gametes or embryos has occurred upon 
divorce. It is not clear whether disagreements over genetic 
material led to these divorces, or whether divorces led to these 
conflicts, but it does not seem far-fetched to suggest that 
treating embryos as property may allow these embryos to be an 
additional “commodity” that spouses compete over. Treating 
embryos as property might also spark disputes upon marital 
dissolution where otherwise there would have been no discord, 
precisely because these embryos may be viewed as invaluable 
to a spouse who seeks to have more children and thus 
potentially more important than their financial assets.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAW REFORM 
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This article has demonstrated that current Canadian legal 
responses to embryo disposition disputes do not adequately 
support the objectives of the AHRA and Quebec’s Act 
Respecting Assisted Procreation. Enforcing embryo disposition 
agreements or consent forms would not take account of the fact 
that individuals may not be in a position at the time of these 
agreements’ creation and signing to make free and informed 
decisions regarding the disposition of any surplus embryos. 
This approach would also have the effect of treating embryo 
disposition agreements as binding contracts, even though 
Canadian law and policy refuses to treat domestic agreements 
between spouses, or contracts relating to adoption or surrogacy 
the same as commercial contracts. Allowing one genetic 
contributor to prevent his or her spouse from using embryos for 
procreation ignores the costs of IVF and the ways in which 
women are disproportionately affected by ART treatment and 
by laws preventing them from using their frozen embryos. This 
response also enables a man to revoke his consent to procreate 
and to be a parent, even though Canadian law in relation to 
abortion, adoption and the parentage of children conceived 
through intercourse and assisted procreation, deny men these 
rights in response to the fact that women are more affected than 
men by reproduction and may be vulnerable to men revoking 
their consent to parent.  
 
Other existing methods for dealing with embryo 
disputes raise similar issues and pose additional problems. 
Allowing for a right not to procreate, even with an exception 
for individuals who cannot otherwise conceive, and providing 
for automatic destruction in the event of a disagreement raise 
the same issues as current Canadian responses. Adopting a 
property approach conflicts with Canadian public policy, which 
seeks to counter the commodification of reproductive 
materials. It seems therefore that a novel approach is warranted 
for dealing with these disputes within the Canadian context.  
 




One suggestion for law reform is that an individual 
who wishes to use embryos for procreative purposes ought to 
be able to do so, even if his or her spouse or partner disagrees. 
In other words, a male donor should be unable to prevent a 
female donor from using embryos for reproductive purposes 
and a woman should not be permitted to prevent her male 
spouse from using embryos with a surrogate or new partner. 
This mutual inability to block the use of embryos for 
procreation would recognize the considerable costs associated 
with creating and freezing embryos for IVF, as well as the fact 
that men and women might be otherwise unable to reproduce 
without the use of these embryos. However, where male and 
female donors each wish to use their embryos for reproductive 
purposes, the woman should be given preference to use them, 
in recognition of the greater physical contribution that she 
made in harvesting her eggs, and the biological reality that 
women’s ova become less viable as they age. This approach 
would also be preferable to dividing them equally between 
spouses, as allowing for this division could communicate a 
message that embryos can be treated like property.  
 
Although it has been argued in some foreign 
jurisprudence that it is contrary to public policy to force one 
spouse to procreate against his or her will, this argument is 
exaggerated. The stronger argument is that forcing individuals 
to destroy their embryos or donate them against their wishes 
runs counter to Canadian law and public policy. As was 
discussed in Part II of this article, while men and women may 
bear the costs of ART treatment and may need to use IVF in 
order to conceive, women are affected more than men by the 
IVF process and because of biological differences may have 
more difficulty conceiving at an older age than men. Canadian 
law and public policy has recognized women’s 
disproportionate contribution in the context of laws relating to 
abortion. Moreover, the AHRA and Quebec’s Act Respecting 
Assisted Procreation make clear that their provisions are 
intended to recognize the power imbalance between men and 




women who make use of assisted procreation, and the 
particular health risks for women undergoing ART treatment. 
In light of this, it seems that law and public policy in the 
context of embryo donation ought to support women’s 
potential desire to have more children ahead of men’s potential 
wish to procreate and also ought to favour the spouse who 
seeks to procreate over a spouse who wants for the embryos to 
remain in storage, be donated or destroyed.  
 
Patients should, however, be clearly informed prior to 
providing their genetic material for IVF that they will be 
unable to revoke their consent to procreate. In other words, 
their spouse or partner will still be able to use the embryos for 
reproduction even if they change their minds. Patients should 
be able to make a free and informed decision as to whether 
they feel comfortable with this option; the empirical research 
which calls into question individuals’ abilities to make 
informed decisions prior to IVF suggests that where individuals 
changed their minds it was with regard to their previously 
expressed intentions regarding donation or destruction.147  
 
It might also be argued that this approach 
problematically forces individuals to be parents against their 
wishes even if a substantial period of time has passed since 
they gave their consent to use their reproductive material for 
assisted procreation. For instance, in the Nott case discussed in 
the introduction to this article, the embryos have now been in 
storage for 9 years. Currently in Canada, unlike other 
jurisdictions,148 there are no limitations on how long embryos 
can remain in storage. Moreover, a woman may be able to use 
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embryos for implantation up until menopause and potentially 
until she reaches the age of 55.149 This means that it would be 
possible for embryos to be used thirty or more years after 
spouses had consented to use their genetic material for 
procreation.  
 
This issue could, however, be addressed without 
preventing one spouse from using embryos for procreative 
purposes. Rather, should spouses divorce and one no longer 
wishes for the embryos to be used for procreation, that spouse 
could be absolved of parental obligations and denied parental 
rights. A number of provinces have now made clear that a 
sperm donor is not a parent simply by virtue of his donation.150 
A smaller number have also stipulated that egg donors and 
embryo donors are similarly not to be considered legal parents, 
unless this was the donors’ and the child’s parents’ 
intentions.151 Spouse who change their minds and do not wish 
for embryos created from their sperm or ova to be used for 
reproduction could be legally considered donors under the law. 
In turn, British Columbia’s Family Law Act now provides that 
if a child was conceived152 through the use of assisted 
procreation while a couple was married or in a marriage-like 
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relationship, the birth mother’s spouse or partner will not be 
considered the child’s parent where there is evidence that he or 
she did not consent to be a parent or withdrew his or her 
consent prior to implantation.153 This provision similarly 
demonstrates that is possible to find that a spouse should not be 
held to be a legal parent despite his or her relationship with the 
child’s mother and potentially despite this spouse having a 
genetic connection to the child.  
 
However, a spouse should only be absolved of parental 
obligations where a substantial period of time has elapsed 
between the time of the embryos’ creation and implantation. 
Allowing one spouse to revoke his or her consent to be a parent 
immediately or shortly after the embryos’ creation would be 
troubling in light of Canadian family law legislation; where a 
woman becomes pregnant and a couple divorces or separates, 
the male spouse or partner will not be off the hook for child 
support simply because he changed his mind. This limitation 
period could be set, for instance, at 3 years or some other 
length of time that is deemed appropriate to reflect the period 
of time in which a couple might have attempted and 
reattempted to have children using frozen embryos. And once 
again, patients should be informed prior to undergoing IVF that 
regardless of whether they separate, they will be held to have 
parental rights and obligations with regard to any children 
conceived during that time period.  
 
Freeing unwilling parents from having parental 
obligations does not stop them from having children produced 
from their genes against their wishes. However, this situation is 
comparable to one in which individuals decide to donate their 
embryos to a third-party and then only decide to revoke their 
consent after the revocation period has elapsed. It may result in 
children being produced contrary to their present intentions, but 
public policy and respect for women’s reproductive choices 
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necessitates that the donors be prohibited from revoking their 
consent in these instances.  
 
In addition, agreements between spouses and fertility 
clinics as to how to dispose of surplus embryos ought to be 
legally unenforceable, especially if they are created prior to 
successfully giving birth, or unsuccessfully completing a round 
of IVF. This would recognize that spouses might not be in a 
position to make free and informed decisions as to how to 
dispose of their surplus embryos prior to undergoing even a 
first cycle of IVF. Spouses ought to be encouraged, following 
completion of their first round of IVF, to discuss and stipulate 
in writing what they would like to do with their surplus 
embryos and what they think should happen in the event they 
divorce or disagree. But these agreements should be viewed – 
similar to surrogacy agreements – as non-binding contracts that 
set out the parties’ wishes, aspirations and expectations. 
Consent provided by either spouse to donate or destroy their 
embryos prior to undergoing IVF treatment should be 
considered invalid, in the same way that a birth mother or 
surrogate cannot consent to relinquish her parental rights, prior 
to giving birth.  
 
Should a disagreement arise between spouses, and 
neither wishes to use the embryos for their own procreation, it 
seems reasonable to create a default that the embryos should be 
destroyed. Allowing for the embryos potentially to be donated 
against one spouse’s wishes would be problematic in light of 
the empirical research, discussed in Part I of this article, 
indicating that most of the time when individuals change their 
minds regarding their disposition decisions they opt to destroy 
their embryos rather than donate them. Dividing them equally 
among spouses could amount to treating the embryos as 
property. In turn, keeping them in storage would require parties 
to continue to pay annual storage fees and would also, over 
time, potentially create problems for fertility clinics with regard 




to storage space.154 Moreover, destruction is the most 
commonly selected option for individuals with surplus embryos 
and thus is arguably a more appropriate default than 
donation.155   
 
Establishing a default of destruction would not please 
everyone. Some might criticize this approach as wasting 
embryos that might otherwise be used for research or which 
might help a childless couple conceive. In turn, the act of 
destroying embryos might be unthinkable to some donors on 
account of their personal or religious beliefs. However, this 
default would only come into effect should a disagreement 
arise between spouses. Should they not wish for the embryos to 
be destroyed they would be given the option to use them for 
their own reproductive purposes.  
 
Finally, fertility clinics should seek to mitigate 
potential conflicts and power imbalances between spouses 
through increased education and counselling. It would 
undoubtedly be beneficial for provincial regulations to mandate 
that all clinics and hospitals provide at least one counselling 
session to individuals who undergo IVF, embryo implantation 
and other forms of treatment involving reproductive 
technologies. These clinics should also ensure that individuals 
undergoing IVF are not only aware of the health risks 
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associated with the procedure, but also of the laws that apply to 
them with regard to embryo disposition.   
 
This overall approach would better account for the 
experiences of individuals who undergo IVF and who need to 
make decisions regarding the disposition of their embryos. It 
would also accord with how Canadian legislatures and courts 
have responded to similar agreements or disputes between 
spouses. Finally, it would better support the objectives of the 
AHRA and Quebec’s Act Respecting Assisted Procreation to 
promote the health and well-being of Canadians – and 
especially women – who use ARTs and to ensure that 
individuals who undergo treatment or who donate their genetic 
materials provide free and informed consent.  
 
